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ABSTRACT
We review the different proposals which have so far been made for the
holographic principle and the related entropy bounds and classify them into
the strong, null and weak forms. These are analyzed, with the aim of dis-
covering which may hold at the level of the full quantum theory of gravity.
We find that only the weak forms, which constrain the information available
to observers on boundaries, are implied by arguments using the generalized
second law. The strong forms, which go further and posit a bound on the
entropy in spacelike regions bounded by surfaces, are found to suffer from
serious problems, which give rise to counterexamples already at the semi-
classical level. The null form, proposed by Fischler, Susskind, Bousso and
others, in which the bound is on the entropy of certain null surfaces, ap-
pears adequate at the level of a bound on the entropy of matter in a single
background spacetime, but attempts to include the gravitational degrees of
freedom encounter serious difficulties. Only the weak form seems capable of
holding in the full quantum theory.
The conclusion is that the holographic principle is not a relationship
between two independent sets of concepts: bulk theories and measures of
geometry vrs boundary theories and measures of information. Instead, it is
the assertion that in a fundamental theory the first set of concepts must be
completely reduced to the second.
∗ smolin@phys.psu.edu
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to examine the question: “Exactly what conse-
quences do the holographic principle[1, 2, 3], and the related entropy bounds[4],
have for the construction of the quantum theory of gravity?”. We will take
it as given that a quantum theory of gravity should be both background in-
dependent and cosmological. This is because both background dependence
and boundaries are almost certainly artifacts of approximations which, while
convenient for certain purposes, exclude significant aspects of the problem of
constructing a theoretical framework which includes and extends the prin-
ciples of both relativity and quantum theory[5].
The question is not easy because most of the results which are so far
known to bear on it are concerned with semiclassical approximations or weak
coupling limits. Many are also limited to situations with boundaries, either
asymptotic or finite. It is, of course, always possible that the holographic
principle is only a characterization of the semiclassical theory, perhaps be-
cause it is no more than a re-expression of the generalized second law of
thermodynamics. On the other hand, given that the entropy bounds involve
inverse powers of h¯G it is very possible that they are deep clues to the struc-
ture of the fundamental theory, and that some version of the holographic
principle may even turn out to be a fundamental principle of the quantum
theory of gravity. If so it will be the first principle that is genuinely quan-
tum gravitational, rather than just being imported from general relativity
or quantum theory.
But if this is to be the case the true, fundamental statement of the
holographic principle must be made in the language of some background
independent quantum theory of cosmology. This is likely to be phrased in
a different language than its semiclassical formulation, for the same reason
that the laws of thermodynamics are expressed in very different language
when expressed fundamentally in quantum statistical mechanics than they
are when one first meets them as characterizations of the thermodynamic
limit. The problem is then to discover what features of the entropy bounds
and holographic principles so far discussed might be artifacts of the semi-
classical limit, and to separate these from the principle’s true content.
In this paper a line of reasoning is presented, which leads to the identi-
fication of a form of the holographic principle that can survive passage to
a background independent quantum theory of cosmology. This is called the
weak holographic principle[10]; it is both logically weaker and conceptually
more radical than the forms of the principle originally contemplated in the
3
literature. It is logically weaker in that it makes no assertion as to a rela-
tionship between a bulk and a boundary theory. As has been found also by
Fischler and Susskind[6] and others[7, 8, 9], that idea already fails at the
semiclassical level for cosmological theories. We found in our investigations
further reasons why such a strong form of the principle cannot be funda-
mental. Instead, the weak holographic principle comes into a background
independent quantum theory of cosmology as a framework for that theory’s
interpretation and measurement theory. Its role is to constrain the quantum
causal structure of a quantum spacetime in a way that connects the geom-
etry of the surfaces on which measurements may be made with a measure
of the information that those measurements may produce. In this context
the entropy bound becomes a definition, by which the notion of geometry
is reduced to more fundamental notions coming from the quantum theory
of cosmology. To put it simply, the Bekenstein bound is turned on its head
and the notion of area is reduced fundamentally to a measure of the flow of
quantum information. This form of the principle was first suggested in [10];
the present paper can be taken as an argument that no form of the principle
which is logically stronger, or conceptually less radical, can survive passage
to a background independent quantum theory of gravity.
One difficulty of the subject is that different authors have proposed dif-
ferent ideas under the name of the holographic hypothesis or principle. It
is necessary first to bring a bit of order to the situation by classifying the
different proposals in a way that uses a common language and makes clear
their logical relations to each other. To do this we use the language of
screens. In this paper a screen will always mean an instantaneous, space-
like, two dimensional surface1 on which quantum mechanical measurements
are made. These will always be measurements of fields on the surface, which
then result in information concerning the causal past of the surface.
To make progress it is first of all necessary to distinguish between en-
tropy bounds and holographic principles. The former are limitations on the
degrees of freedom attributable to either the screens themselves, or spacelike
or null surfaces bounded by the screens. In the literature entropy bounds are
sometimes called holographic bounds, but we will stick to the former expres-
sion to avoid confusion. A holographic principle extends an entropy bound
by postulating a form of dynamics in which the quantum evolution of the
spacetime and matter fields is described in terms of observables measurable
on the screens.
1Or, in D + 1 dimensions a surface of dimension D − 1.
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We find that the different entropy bounds and holographic principles that
have been proposed fall each into three classes, which we call the “strong”
“null” and “weak” forms[10]. The different entropy bounds all postulate
that some measure of information or of a“number of degrees of freedom” is
bounded by the area of a screen. The strong forms are those that postulate
that the bound applies to the degrees of freedom on a spacelike surface
bounded by the screen. The null forms are those, suggested by Fischler and
Susskind[6] and put in a very elegant form by Bousso[8, 9] and Flanagan,
Marolf and Wald[11], in which there is a bound on the number of degrees of
freedom of certain null surfaces, bounded by the screens. The weak form,
proposed with Markopoulou in [10], postulates only a relationship between
the area of the screens and the dimension of the Hilbert spaces which provide
representations of algebras of observables on them.
The main conclusion of this paper will be that the strong entropy bound
cannot hold in a cosmological theory, and that the null form may only hold
in a semiclassical theory in which quantized matter degrees of freedom evolve
on a fixed spacetime manifold, but cannot survive the quantization of the
gravitational field. It appears that only the weak form, which as the name
suggests is logically weaker and therefore requires less, may survive in a full
theory of quantum gravity.
The different forms of the entropy bound stem from different interpreta-
tions that may be given to the Bekenstein bound[4]. These, may be called
the strong and weak Bekenstein bounds. They are presented in the next
section. The distinction is that the weak form bounds only the information
measurable by observers just outside the horizon of a black hole, while the
strong form bounds the total number of degrees of freedom measurable in
the interior of the horizon. We find that only the weak form is required
by the usual arguments based on the laws of thermodynamics. The strong
form of the Bekenstein bound follows only if we add an independent as-
sumption, which is that the number of degrees of freedom measurable on
the interior does not exceed those measurable on the exterior. We call this
the strong entropy assumption. It must be postulated independently, as it
does not follow from any argument which involves only measurements made
exterior to the black hole horizon. This conclusion has been reached also
by Jacobson[12]. One of the conclusions of this paper is that the strong en-
tropy assumption is false. Among other things it is inconsistent with both
inflation and gravitational collapse.
The strong, null and weak forms of the holographic principle depend on
the corresponding forms of the entropy bounds. They extend each of them
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by giving a framework for dynamics. As only the weak form of the entropy
bound seems to be possible in a full quantum theory of gravity, only a weak
form of the holographic principle may be true in such a theory.
The author is aware that this is not a completely welcome conclusion.
In fact, it goes against his own proposal for a bulk to boundary isomor-
phism in quantum general relativity and supergravity[13, 14, 15]. It unfor-
tunately conflicts also with some of the hopes which have been held concern-
ing the AdS/CFT correspondence[16, 17]. It is then necessary to discover
if there is any conflict between the conclusions reached here and the many
results which have been found which support some version of the AdS/CFT
conjecture[17]. We find that there is not. This is likely because most of the
results so far found are consequences of much weaker assumptions, which
involve only the transformation properties of observables under the super-
symmetric extension of SO(D, 2). In fact, Rehren[18] has shown rigorously
that a correspondence will always exist between theories on an AdSD back-
ground and conformal field theories on MinkD−1, subject only to the con-
dition that the latter exist. The results so far found concerning AdS/CFT
then may hold as a consequence of this theorem. To the extent that this is
true they do not then provide any independent evidence for a strong version
of the holographic principle that would go beyond this case.
Does this mean that there is something wrong with the idea that the
holographic principle may play a role in string theory, as was suggested by
the original arguments for the AdS/CFT correspondence[16, 17]? Certainly,
not, what it means is that if it is to go beyond the level of description in terms
of dynamics of strings and branes in fixed classical background spacetimes,
string theory must be formulated in a background independent langauge.
Forms of the holographic principle that may suffice in the context of physics
on a single fixed background are likely to be of limited validity, but the
results of our arguments is that there are forms of the bounds and principle
that may hold in a background independent theory. In fact, as we argued
in [10], the weak holographic principle may hold in background independent
formulations of string theory[54].
We now give an outline of the paper, emphasizing the logical structure
of its argument.
This paper is divided into two parts. The first concerns entropy bounds.
In the next section we discuss the weak and strong versions of the Bekenstein
bound and establish the claims made above.
In section 3 we turn our attention to cosmology and find that the weak
and strong Bekenstein bounds each imply a cosmological bound, called re-
6
spectively the weak and strong cosmological entropy bounds. As in the
non-cosmological case, the strong form cannot be derived without making
the strong entropy assumption.
In section 4 we then give five counterexamples to the strong cosmological
holographic bound. These are
1. The gravitational collapse problem.
2. The inflation problem.
3. The wiggly surface problem.
4. The two-sided problem.
5. The throat problem.
The conclusion is that the strong cosmological entropy bound is false.
Since this followed from known physics plus the strong entropy assumption,
the likely conclusion is that the latter cannot hold in a gravitational theory.
We then describe, in section 5, the new cosmological entropy bound
proposed by Bousso[8], which we call the null entropy bound. It seems to
be correct at the classical and semiclassical level, as a bound on the matter
entropy in a fixed spacetime. However, to play a role in a quantum theory of
gravity, an entropy bound should extend to a case in which the gravitational
degrees of freedom are dynamical. In section 6 we present two arguments
why the null entropy cannot hold once the gravitational degrees of freedom
are turned on, either classically or quantum mechanically.
The only form of an entropy bound that can then survive at the level
of a full quantum theory of cosmology is then the weak form. This is the
conclusion of our discussion of entropy bounds.
The second part of the paper concerns the question of whether, given the
conclusions reached in the first part, there is any form of a holographic prin-
ciple that may hold in a quantum theory of gravity. Such a principle must
give a framework within which to describe the dynamics of the degrees of
freedom constrained by the entropy bounds. Most forms of the holographic
principle which have been discussed assume the strong form of the entropy
bound. Dynamics is then formulated in terms of a map between the bulk
and boundary Hilbert spaces that preserves unitary evolution. Since the
strong form of the entropy bound seems to disagree with things we believe
to be true, such a strong form of the holographic principle is ruled out, at
least for the case of gravitational theories.
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In section 8 we consider this situation carefully, as it is not what many
people’s intuition seems to suggest. We show that there is no contradiction
with what we know, even taking into account all the results found concerning
the AdS/CFT correspondence. We also note that an elegant solution to the
black hole information paradox is still available.
We then raise the question of whether there might be a weaker form of
the holographic principle which may still hold. We consider first, in section
9, the question of whether some form of the holographic principle may be
associated with the null entropy bound. We reach the conclusion that such
a principle may exist, but it must be based on a modification of quantum
theory in which there are many Hilbert spaces, one for each screen.
However, if the null entropy bound cannot survive the turning on of the
gravitational degrees of freedom, neither can the null version of the holo-
graphic principle. We are then left with the question of whether there might
be a weak version of the holographic principle, which would correspond with
the weak entropy bound. We first, in section 10, discuss the question of
which two surfaces may be screens in such a formulation. We come to the
conclusion that none of the possible criteria for distinguishing screens from
other two surfaces can survive passage to the full quantum theory. Therefor
every spacelike two surface may be considered a screen. This opens up the
possibility of defining geometry in terms of the properties of screens, rather
than visa versa.
In section 11 we then list the conclusions of the argument reached till this
point, which then may be considered to motivate and constrain the possible
forms of a weak holographic principle. One possible form of the principle,
given in [10] is then reviewed in section 12. There we also describe briefly
two independent arguments for a weak form of the holographic principle.
These come from considerations of the role of quasi-local observables in
general relativity and, in a form made originally by Crane[3], from relational
formulations of quantum cosmology.
The paper then closes with a short summary of the main conclusions.
Part I
ENTROPY BOUNDS
8
2 The weak and strong forms of the Bekenstein
bound
The different possible entropy bounds, as well as the different possible forms
that the holographic principle might take, have their origin in the fact that
different meanings may be given to the entropy of a black hole. To see this,
let us distinguish
• The thermodynamic black hole entropy
Sbh =
A
4Gh¯
(1)
which enters the laws of black hole mechanics.(here A is the area of
the black hole horizon.)
• Iweakbh , Weak black hole entropy This is a measure of how much
information an observer external to its horizon can gain about its
interior, from measurements made outside the horizon. Besides the
mass, angular momentum and charges, this includes measurements of
the quanta emitted by the black hole.
• Istrongbh , Strong black hole entropy This is a measure of how much
information is contained in the interior of the black hole. This can
also be expressed as the “number of degrees of freedom” inside the
black hole, or the number of distinct ways in which it might have been
assembled.
We may note that the generalized second law requires require that
Iweakbh ≤ Sbh (2)
This is because all of the arguments for it concern exchanges of matter and
radiation between the black hole and observers situated outside its horizon.
They do so because they assume that the semiclassical approximation is
valid so that the only way that matter or information can cross from the
interior to the exterior is in the form of thermalized Hawking radiation.
We may note that the number of quanta emitted by a black hole during
Hawking radiation is on the order of (1), this is consistent with eq. (2).
We are, of course, ignorant of what happens when a black hole evaporates
to any state in which it has a mass of the order of the Planck scale. The only
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thing we know with any confidence is that the semiclassical approximation
breaks down. To attack this problem many authors either implicitly or
explicitly make the following assumption
• Strong entropy assumption:
Istrongbh = I
weak
bh (3)
This is an attractive assumption. For example, it suggests that there
may be a single Hilbert space, which is a representation of operators at
infinity, within which the full evolution of a system, from prior to black hole
collapse to the aftermath of complete evaporation, may be represented as
unitary evolution. However, we should note that the logic is not symmetric,
as there are remnant scenarios under which unitary evolution does not imply
(3). Nor can (3) be supported by any arguments for the generalized second
law, as they concern only exchanges of material across the black hole horizon
described in the semiclassical approximation. Thus, it is logically possible
that (3) is false and that
Istrongbh > I
weak
bh (4)
It is also possible that Istrongbh is not even a well defined quantity.
The arguments which are usually taken as supporting some version of the
holographic hypothesis depend strongly on whether or not (3) is assumed.
To see this, let us run the standard Bekenstein argument2.
The Bekenstein argument
Consider a timelike three dimensional region R of an asymptotically flat
spacetime M, the quantum dynamics of which we wish to study. We will
assume R has topology R = Σ×R, where Σ is a spatial manifold. We will
restrict attention to the physics within R by the imposition of boundary
conditions on ∂R = ∂Σ×R. We will denote S = ∂Σ. These will restrict the
degrees of freedom of the gravitational field on the boundary; as a result a
reduced set of observables will be able to vary at the boundary.
Let AS be the complete algebra of the unconstrained observables on
a spatial slice of the boundary, S. This will have a representation on a
2This form of the argument is taken from [19], but it is due originally to Bekenstein[4].
There is also some confusion because a different bound, S < RE, where E is the energy
of a system was also postulated by Bekenstein to hold in ordinary quantum field theory,
in the absence of gravity. The bound we need,(2) is logically weaker than that, and so
arguments against this hypothesis do not necessarily contradict (2).
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Hilbert space HS . We will always assume that HS is the smallest non-
trivial representation, i.e. it contains no operators that commute with the
representatives of AS . We will call these the boundary observables algebra
and boundary Hilbert space. We may assume that among the elements of
AS are the Hamiltonian, HS and the areas of regions I of the boundary S,
which I will denote A[I]. Recall that in general relativity the Hamiltonian
is, up to terms proportional to constraints, defined as an integral on the
boundary and is thus an element of AS .
Since the system contains gravitation, we may assume that among the
spectrum of states in HS are a subspace which correspond to the pres-
ence of black holes in Σ. These are semiclassical statistical states, and we
will assume that their statistical entropies, given by the dimensions of the
corresponding subspaces of HS are given by the usual formula (1), in the
semiclassical limit when their masses and areas are large in Planck units.
We will consider only systems in thermal equilibrium. This rules out
examples from cosmology or astrophysics in which the thermalization time
or light-crossing time is longer than the time in which the system will grav-
itationally collapse.
The argument is simplest in the case that we assume that the induced
metric on S is spherical, up to small perturbations corresponding to weak
gravitational waves passing through the boundary. The argument proceeds
by contradiction. We assume that the region Σ can contain an object O
whose complete specification in the boundary Hilbert space HΣ requires an
amount of information IO which is larger than
IS =
A[S]
4l2P l
(5)
which is of course the entropy of a black hole whose horizon just fits inside
of S.
Let us assume that initially we know nothing about O, so that IO is a
measure of the entropy of the system. However, with no other information
we can conclude that O is not a black hole, as the largest entropy that could
be contained in any black hole in Σ is IS . We may then argue, using the
Hoop theorem[20] that the energy contained within Σ (as measured either
by a quasi-local energy on the surface or at infinity) must be less than that
in a black hole whose horizon has area A[S]. But this being the case we can
now add energy slowly to the system to bring it up through an adiabatic
transformation to the mass of that black hole. By the hoop theorem this
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will have the result of transforming O into the black hole whose horizon just
fits inside the sphere S.
This can be done by dropping quanta slowly into the black hole, in a
way that does not raise the entropy of its exterior. As a result, once the
black hole has formed we know the entropy of the system, it is IS . But we
started with a system with entropy IO, which we assumed is larger. Thus,
we have violated the generalized second law of thermodynamics. The only
way to avoid this is if IO < IS .
Since this is a bound on the total information that could be represented
in HS , we have
lnDim [HS ] = IS = A[S]
4l2P l
(6)
We may remark that this argument employs a mixture of classical, sta-
tistical and semiclassical reasoning. For example, it assumes both that the
hoop theorem from classical general relativity applies, in the case of black
hole masses large in Planck units, to real, quantum black holes. One might
attempt to make a detailed argument that this must be the case if the quan-
tum theory is to have a good classical limit. However worthy of a task, this
will not be pursued here, as it is unlikely that any such argument can be
elevated to establish the necessity, rather than plausibility of the Bekenstein
bound, in the absence of a complete theory of quantum gravity.
What does the Bekenstein argument imply?
We may note that the above argument involves only the weak form of the
black hole entropy, Iweakbh . This is because what is under discussion is the
description of the system as given by states in the boundary Hilbert space
HS . This is, as emphasized, a representation of the algebra of operators AS
measurable on the boundary. This is sufficient to make the argument, as
the crucial steps involves a) use of the hoop theorem and b) adiabatically
feeding energy into the system, both of which concern only measurements
or operations which may be made on the boundary. The conclusion of the
argument then only concerns the dimension of HS , and hence only external
measurements. We may express this by saying that the argument demon-
strates the
• Weak Bekenstein bound Let a system Σ be defined by the identifi-
cation of a fixed boundary ∂Σ = S, and a Hilbert space HS be defined
as the smallest faithful representation of the algebra of observables AS
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measurable on the boundary only. Either the area A[S], is fixed or is
in AS . In the first case,
DimHS ≤ e
A[S]
4Gh¯ (7)
where G is the physical, macroscopic Newton’s constant. In the case
that A[S] ∈ AS , the Hilbert space HS must be decomposable into
eigenspaces of A[S] such that (7) is true in each.
Without further assumptions this implies nothing for quantities that
refer essentially to the “bulk” such as “the number of degrees of freedom
contained in the region Σ”. In order that the argument goes further we may
add to it the independent assumption that (3) holds. This then does imply
the
• Strong Bekenstein bound. Under the same assumptions, let Hbulk
be the smallest faithful representation of the algebra of local observ-
ables measurable in the interior of Σ. Then
DimHbulk ≤ e
A[S]
4Gh¯ (8)
To summarize, the important points are that the generalized second
law implies only the weak Bekenstein bound, and that the strong entropy
assumption is an independent hypothesis. The logic is then that
Black hole thermodynamics+second law+Hoop theorem→ weak Bekenstein bound.
(9)
and
weak Bekenstein bound+strong entropy assumption→ strong Bekenstein bound
(10)
3 The weak and strong cosmological entropy bounds
We now turn to the question of whether some form of a holographic bound
may apply to a cosmological theory in which no boundary conditions have
been enforced. Let us consider any closed surface, S, which bounds a region
R in a compact spatial slice, Σ of a cosmological spacetime. No boundary
conditions have been imposed on S, thus its interior, R should contain
more “degrees of freedom” than would be the case were boundary conditions
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imposed, because boundary conditions always act by suppressing degrees
of freedom, and hence reducing the number of classical solutions, in the
neighborhood of the boundary. This means that the above bounds have
implications for the representation spaces of algebras of observables that
describe regions without boundary conditions imposed.
To make this precise, let AfreeS be the total algebra of observables mea-
surable on S, when no boundary conditions have been imposed, and let AbcS
be the algebra of observables which remain unconstrained when a particular
set of boundary conditions have been imposed. Let HfreeS and HbcS be their
corresponding representation spaces. Clearly AbcS ⊂ AfreeS , which implies
that
HbcS ⊂ HfreeS (11)
This means that
dim(HbcS ) ≤ dim(HfreeS ) (12)
We assume that the set of variables which are fixed by the boundary con-
ditions make up a commuting subalgebra of AfreeS , otherwise they could
not all be imposed at once. It is also natural to assume that the amount
of information concerning the state in HfreeS which is necessary to fix the
boundary conditions is proportional to the area A[S]. It then follows that
ln dim(HfreeS ) = ln dim(HbcS ) + α
A[S]
Gh¯
(13)
where α is some dimensionless constant. We call this the boundary condition
area assumption.
By putting this together with the weak Bekenstein bound for the system
with boundary conditions, (7) we find that,
ln dim(HfreeS ) =
(
1
4
+ α
)
A[S]
Gh¯
(14)
Note that this follows that even though no boundary conditions have been
applied at S. Thus, we have a bound that applies to surfaces inside cosmo-
logical spacetimes.
• Weak cosmological entropy bound. Let S be a spacelike surface
of spacetime codimension 2 that splits a complete spacelike hypersur-
face into two regions, let AfreeS be the complete algebra of observables
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measurable on S and let HfreeS be its smallest representation space.
Then,
ln dim(HfreeS ) = C
A[S]
Gh¯
(15)
for some S independent constant C.
There is also a strong form of this argument. If we assume the strong
entropy assumption, (3), then the same argument leads to
• Strong cosmological entropy bound. Let S be a spacelike surface
of spacetime codimension 2 that splits a complete spacelike hypersur-
face into two regions, let AstrongS be the complete algebra of observables
measurable on the interior of S and let HstrongS be its smallest repre-
sentation space. Then,
ln dim(HstrongS ) = C
A[S]
Gh¯
. (16)
We again summarize the logic,
weak bekenstein bound+bc. area assumption→ weak cosmological entropy bound
(17)
weak cosmological entropy bound + srong entropy assumption
→ strong cosmological entropy bound(18)
4 Counterexamples to the strong cosmological en-
tropy bound
Unfortunately, the strong cosmological entropy bound contradicts known
physics. This is shown by the following five counterexamples.
The gravitational collapse problem
Consider a co-moving region R(τ) in a closed Friedman Robertson cosmol-
ogy, where τ is the standard FRW time coordinate. Let us assume that
at the time of maximum expansion, τ0, R(τ0) contains a uniform gas with
entropy S(τ0), while its boundary has area A(τ0). If we assume the strong
cosmological holographic bound (16) then S0 < A(τ0)/4Gh¯. However as
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the volume of the universes decreases after τ0, so will A(τ). But, by the
second law S(τ) will increase. There will then be a time τ1 such that
S0 = A(τ0)/4Gh¯. After that the strong cosmological bound will be violated.
Since the spacetime geometry, and the distribution of gas, are uniform, the
bound cannot be saved by the formation of a black hole. A similar problem
occurs for boxes of radiation dropped into black holes.
Note that this example escapes the conditions of the Bekenstein argu-
ment because the universe is not asymptotically flat.
The inflation problem
It is not hard to see that inflation provides counterexamples to the strong
cosmological holographic bound, arising from the fact that in the aftermath
of inflation a universe will have approximately uniform regions exponentially
larger than the Hubble scale3. The real horizon size RH at any given time
can then be arbitrarily large compared to the hubble scale H, and still
contain entropy created in a single causally connected region since the initial
singularity.
To see this we follow the exposition of Kolb and Turner, [21]. We follow
a causally connected region which begins as a patch of the size of H−1 at
the time inflation starts, which is equal to
H−1 =
mP
M2
= Rinitial (19)
where M is a mass scale associated with the inflaton potential, which is
between the Planck scale and the weak scale. The past lightcone of this
patch will just touch4 the initial surface t = 0.
There is then a period of inflation, in which the patch expands to a
size eNRinitial which is followed by a period of reheating, during which it
expands by a further factor of
(
M4
T 4
)1/3
(20)
where T is the reheating temperature. During reheating a bath of black
body radiation is created from the dissipation of the inflaton field with
temperature T , after which the inflation sits in the bottom of its potential
3This argument has been raised independently in [7].
4so that it corresponds to the case Fischler and Susskind[6] considered.
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and the universe is, to a very good approximation, spatially flat. Agreement
with observations seems to require
N > 60 (21)
Just after reheating the region we may try to apply the Bekenstein bound
to the huge bubble that the patch has grown up to be, which is of radius
Rr = lP e
N (
mp
T
)4/3(
mp
M
)2/3 (22)
as space is flat it encloses a volume 8pi/3R3r , which contains an entropy
Sr =
8piν
3
T 3R3r =
8piν
3
e3N
m3P
M2T
(23)
where
ν =
pi2
40
g∗ (24)
is of order 20 as g∗ is of order 100. If we ask that this entropy be bounded
by 1/4 the horizon area in Planck units we have
Sr ≤ 4pi2R2r (25)
This seems to put a bound on N which rules out inflation. This happens
because the entropy contained in the horizon grows as e3N while its area
only grows as e2N . The result is that (6) implies a strict bound on Rr,
Rr ≤ 3
2ν
(
mP
T
)3 (26)
which means that the number of efoldings is bounded by
N ≤ ln 3
2ν
+
5
3
ln
mP
T
− 2
3
ln
mP
M
. (27)
If we use physically reasonable values forM and T it is impossible that there
were as many as 60 e-foldings. Thus, the strong cosmological holographic
bound (16) is in conflict with the standard inflationary scenario.
What went wrong? To see that the problem is inflation we may note that
if we were ignorant of inflation having taken place, and took the inverse
hubble scale H−1 for the horizon size just after reheating instead of the
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much larger Rr the strong cosmological holographic bound (16) yields the
reasonable statement that,
T ≤
√
2
3piν
mP . (28)
So, we may wonder, why isn’t the huge region of radius Rr unstable to
gravitational collapse. It is clearly, for it has a Schwarzchild radius
RSch = lP4piνe
3N (
mP
M
)2 (29)
Requiring that Rr > RSch yields an even stricter bound on the number of
efoldings,
N <
2
3
ln(
M
T
)− 1
2
ln(4piν) (30)
So the region created by inflation is unstable to gravitational collapse. Given
any inhomogeneities these will grow and, if they are large enough, form black
holes. But this is nothing new, it is just the process of galaxy and structure
formation. Indeed, because Ω is now very close to one, large regions of the
bubble must be unstable to the gravitational collapse that must eventually
occur in any region in which, locally, Ω > 1.
All of the entropy contained in the region blown up by inflation corre-
sponds to ordinary thermal fluctuations in the radiation produced by re-
heating. As the process of reheating is an ordinary physical process, and as
the inflation field may be assumed to have been in a coherent state before
inflation began, we must believe that there are all the degrees of freedom in
that region given naively by the entropy we have computed. That entropy is,
indeed, a measure of how much information would be needed to determine
the precise quantum state which resulted from the process of reheating.
However, because the causal horizon has blown up to such a big size
from inflation, that information required is much much greater, for standard
inflation models, than the area of the horizon just after reheating in Planck
units. (recall indeed that in most standard inflationary scenarios, N is much
great than its minimal value of 60 and may easily be > 104.
The inflation problem shows that there can be a surface in the universe,
the causal horizon, Sch, whose information content, proportional to its area,
is too small to reconstruct the state of all the thermal photons in its interior.
Is this a problem for a consistent cosmological formulation of the holographic
principle? To answer this we have to ask what information about the interior
may arrive at a surface at the causal horizon. The key point is that because
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of the exponential expansion, an observer there is not able to observe that
thermalization has taken place over all but a small shell of the interior, in
the neighborhood of Sch. For the rest the observer can see causal effects
only from the region prior to inflation and reheating, when a description
in terms of a pure state is completely adequate. This is because, prior to
reheating, the state during that era is very close to the vacuum, and hence
can be described with very little information.
We may contrast this with the information available for a surface Soh
within the conventional ordinary horizon, with r < H, the Hubble scale. An
observer at such a surface sees the region in the interior after reheating and
thus sees a thermal distribution of photons. But the region is small enough
that enough information is available on Sohs to reconstruct the states of
those thermal photons.
Is there a conflict between these two descriptions? No, not if one takes
into account two facts. First, the observer at the smaller surface must see
a mixed state, because the photons in the interior of Soh will be correlated
with photons in their exterior. Only from the much larger surface Sch can
an observer reconstruct a pure state, because they see all the correlations
between the thermal photons created by the inflation and subsequent re-
heating. However, it takes much less information to describe the pure state
than to describe the thermal state, in the whole of the interior of Sch be-
cause once the quantum correlations are neglected one must account for all
the individual states of all the individual photons.
Second, because of causality, the observer at the larger surface Sch is
only able to observe the state in the interior at a much earlier time, before
inflation and reheating, when a pure state description, requiring much less
information, is appropriate.
This examples teaches us that the holographic bound concerns only the
information available on a surface Sch by virtue of quanta which reach it
from the interior. This is not the same information as would be required to
reconstruct the state of the system on a spacelike surface spanning Soh. They
are different because by causality, the information available on a surface
is that information that can reach the surface by causal propagation of
information from the interior5.
5One may ask why this example does not provide a counterexample to the Bekenstein
bound. The reason is that a large region of an inflationary universe is excluded because
the light crossing, and hence thermalization time is long compared to the time scale
for subregions to gravitationally collapse. These cases were excluded explicitly in the
argument, because the step in which one evolves equilibrium states adiabatically by slowly
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The wiggly surface problem
Next, we consider three two-dimensional surfaces in a compact spatial slice
Σ. The first two are S1 and S2, with S1 ∈ Int(S2), where Int(S2) is the
region in Σ to the interior of S2. For example, these could be constant
r surfaces in a constant t slice of Schwarzchild-De Sitter, (using standard
coordinates) with r1 < r2. In such a case we can choose A1 < A2, which
implies that less information could be represented on A1 than on A2. This
makes sense because there is a region between the two surfaces that contains
physics that may be observed by the observer at S2 that is not observed by
the observer at S1.
Now consider a surface S′1, just to the interior of A1 which is gotten by
displacing S1 slightly into its interior, and then wiggling it, for example by
superposing on it some set of waves. The wiggled surface can easily have area
A′1 > A2 > A1. What are we to make of the apparent fact that the surface
S′1, can contain an amount of information greater than the other two? If S1
contains all the information about its interior, then the information coded
on S′1 cannot be greater than that coded on S1. But as it has a greater area,
it seems to have a greater information capacity.
The wiggly surface problem tells us that the area that is relevant for
the measure of information is not the actual area of the surface S. Rather
it must correspond to the information reaching S from its interior. This
can be achieved if we identify the surface S with a cross-section σ(S) of a
congruence of light rays which intersect S. We may note that the original
arguments of Susskind and others were phrased in terms of such congruences
of light rays[2, 22].
This has an important implication. The bounds on the information on
a screen, S, cannot refer just to that surface. It must refer instead to the
minimal area of cross-sections through a congruence of light rays that arrive
at S from the past.
The two-sided problem
Consider now a surface S of area A and topology S2 embedded in a compact
spatial manifold Σ, which we take to be an S3. Then S splits the universe
into two three-balls B±,such that Σ = B+ ∪ B−, each bounded by a side
of S, which we will call S±. The problem is that if S is a screen there
are actually two possible holographic descriptions, associated with S±. One
dripping in energy cannot be realized.
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should codes a description of B+, the other should codes a description of
B−.
Assume that the universe is in a semiclassical state, so that we may to
a reasonable approximation describe the geometry of Σ classically. Then
consider taking A in Planck units smaller and smaller. The holographic
principle must associate to each screen S± a state space H±. These must
have the same dimension, which is shrinking as eA/4l
2
pl . But one of the
two balls, say B+ contains almost the whole universe, while the other B−
contains only a small region. Since the universe is classical, it is large in
Plank units. We have no problem imagining that the physics in B− is coded
in a state space of dimension bounded by eA/4l
2
pl , as that is a very small
region. But it seems the physics in B+, which is almost the entire universe
must also be describable in terms of state space of this small dimension.
This seems at first paradoxical. It seems that this will require that
an arbitrarily small screen may be required to code information about an
arbitrarily large region. Is it possible to resolve this paradox?
It is, if we apply the conclusion of the wiggly surface problem. We see
that what is relevant is not the information that may reside on a spacelike
surfaces spanning S+ and S− but the information reaching those surfaces
transmitted by a congruence of light rays from their pasts. This is not
necessarily the same thing because to transmit information the light must
be focused on the surface. We must then consider the cost in entropy of
focusing light from a large universe onto a small surface. The apparent loss
of information in recording the holographic image of the large universe on
a small surface may be explained if the entropy generated (or information
required) by the processes of focusing the light on the surface is large.
Consider a small surface, S, with area of 100l2pl in a large universe with
volume 10180l3P l. In order for information about the state of the whole
universe to arrive at S a congruence of light rays originating all over the
universe must be focused very precisely so that its focal plane is the surface
S at a fixed time t (measured by a clock at S.) In a universe in thermal
equilibrium, the operation of focusing a congruence of light rays so precisely,
in a manner that compensates for all the structure in the gravitational field
due to the presence and motion of matter will generate a huge amount of
entropy. The result6 is that a great deal of information about the universe
6This can be made more quantitative, and will be elsewhere. Note that as we are
discussion the properties of a full quantum theory of gravity, counter-examples based on
classical solutions with isometries are irrelevant. It is always possible to find counterex-
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is then stored, not on S, but in the configuration of matter or lenses that
had to be organized in order to get the light to focus on S.
This will only be unnecessary if the universe is completely symmetric.
However such a universe will, by virtue of its symmetry, contain only a few
bits of information7.
The throat problem
There are spacetimes, (M,g), in which the following situation occurs. (M,g)
contains a spacelike slices Σ, with three embedded two dimensional surfaces
S1,S2,S3, with S3 ∈ Int(S2) ∈ Int(S1), but in which their areas satisfy
A1 > A2 < A3. This can happen if, for example, (M,g) is a Kruskal
completion of a black hole solution, S1 is a surface outside the horizon, S2
is the throat of the black hole, and S3 is a two surface which is at smaller
r than the throat, and is topologically contained in it, but yet has larger
area8.
There is a large class of such examples in which the Kruskal spacetime
is truncated inside the throat, and a compact region is glued on containing
matter, describing what is sometimes called a “baby universe”. Such uni-
verses are conjectured to arise in a large class of scenarios in which quantum
effects lead to an avoidance of the formation of the singularity. The problem
is that the baby universe is topologically inside S2, but contains 2-surfaces
which have a larger area.
To make the problem more worrying we can also imagine that A1 > A3.
In such situations it seems like an observer inside the baby universe at S1
can have more information about the contents of the baby universe than can
the observer at S3 who is outside the horizon of the black hole. This means
that the observer at S3 may not have enough information to reconstruct the
whole state in the interior of the black hole.
amples to statistical theorems from examples with non-generic symmetries, consider for
example the ellipsoid with a point source of light at one focal point. It apparently will
not stay in equilibrium.
7It might be objected that there is a limit in which the area, and hence the information
capacity, of the surface is strictly zero. But this is not true, under quite generic assump-
tions in quantum gravity and supergravity there is a minimal unit of area, which is greater
than zero[23, 24, 25].
8This example is not cosmological, but can easily be made so by inserting the black
hole into a cosmological solution.
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5 Identifying the wrong assumption
It is difficult to see how to escape the conclusion that the strong cosmological
entropy bound is false. One might hope for escapes from one or two of the
counterexamples, but it is difficult to see how to escape all of them. The
first two are particularly difficult, as it would be hard to accept a universe
without either gravitational collapse or inflation. The fact that the strong
cosmological entropy bound prohibits either, in principle, means that it must
be in conflict with the basic principles of general relativity.
If the strong entropy bound is false, then so must be at least one of the
assumptions that went into its derivation. This is why we have been careful
to summarize the logic at each step. The list of assumptions that went into
it are:
• The first and (generalized) second law of thermodynamics
• Classical and semiclassical black hole thermodynamics.
• The hoop theorem.
• The boundary condition area assumption, eq. (13).
• The strong entropy assumption.
Of these, the boundary condition area assumption is a technical assump-
tion, that helps make the argument cleanly, but if we had to drop it we could
still construct the counterexamples. They would just take place within a
box, rather than in a cosmological spacetime and so they would then con-
tradict the strong form of the Bekenstein bound. But they would bite no
less in that context.
There is a great deal of evidence for classical and semiclassical black
hole thermodynamics and we have no independent evidence that the basic
principles of thermodynamics are not to be trusted in this regime. The hoop
theorem is also well understood and established. The only assumption on
this list without independent support is the strong entropy assumption. It
must then be wrong.
In fact, as we have emphasized, none of the arguments in the subject
provide any independent support for the strong entropy assumption. There
is then no argument for the validity of anything stronger than the weak
Bekenstein bound and weak cosmological entropy bound.
6 The null entropy bound
We now turn to a different kind of entropy bound bound, proposed by
Bousso[8], following a suggestion of Fischler and Susskind[6]. They pro-
posed that the bound restricts the information, or number of degrees of
freedom on null, rather than spacelike surfaces bounding the screens.
This principle may be stated as follows.
• Null entropy bound (Bousso). We fix a spacetime manifold (M, g)
on which a quantum field theory has been defined. A screen S will be
an oriented two dimensional spacelike surface, possibly open. We then
consider one of the four congruences of null geodesics which leave the
screen orthogonally, either to the future or the past, and to the left or
right of the screen. These may be labeled L±l,r. We call each a light
surface associated to S.
• Each of the four light surfaces L±l,r may contain a subsurface, L which
satisfies the following condition: The expansion of null rays θ (in the
direction going away from S) is non-positive at each point of L. If
the boundary of L contains S then we call L a light sheet of S. The
boundary of L will generally contain, besides S, a set on which the
condition θ ≤ 0 fails to hold, either because of the existence of crossing
points or caustics, or because the lightsheet intersects a singularity of
the spacetime.
• Now, let s˜a be the entropy current density of matter, so that
S[L] =
∫
L
d3xas˜
a (31)
is the entropy crossing the light sheet. Then the null entropy bound is
S[L] ≤ A[S]
4Gh¯
(32)
Before turning to its implications, we should mention a possible coun-
terexample, which was proposed by Lowe[26], as its refutation shows the sub-
tlety of the null entropy bound. Consider a box containing a Schwarzchild
black hole and thermal radiation, which are in equilibrium at a temperature
T . If the box is small enough the ensemble including the black hole has
positive specific heat, so the equilibrium is stable. Let us then consider a
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spherical spacelike two surface, S which is a slice of the horizon H of the
black hole. Lowe suggests that the horizon H+ to the future of S should
be considered a light sheet of S. But as the geometry is static, H+ has no
boundary besides S, so that ∫H+ d3xas˜a will diverge, since s˜a is also constant
in equilibrium. Thus, (32) is apparently violated.
The problem, as pointed out by Bousso[8, 9] is that in determining the
actual light sheets of S we cannot use the static geometry, as that is just
an averaged description of the actual spacetime geometry. As in any case in
which the second law is evoked in a statistical system, we must be careful
to take the thermal fluctuations around equilibrium into account. They
cause small fluctuations in the spacetime geometry, the result of which is
that the actual light sheets L of S will not coincide with H+, when the
latter is defined in terms of the average, static geometry. Instead, the small
fluctuations will cause parts of the real light sheet to deviate either inside or
outside of the averaged horizon. Those that fall inside will shortly hit the
singularity (or else, if the singularity is avoided by a bounce, cross, causing
caustics.) Those that deviate away from the horizon no longer satisfy the
condition that θ ≤ 0. Thus the real light sheets will have outer boundaries.
Bousso then argues in [9] that the bound will be satisfied.
We may note also that the possible counterexample could be avoided if
one only required that the light surface satisfy θ < 0, so as to rule out the
marginal case θ = 0. Bousso chooses not to do this as that would eliminate
the important example of static black hole horizons.
Finally, we may note that a proof of a closely related conjecture has been
given in [11].
As a result, it appears, at least as of this writing, that Bousso’s null
entropy bound agrees with everything we know. It then may be considered
to be a useful, and surprising feature of general relativity at the classical
and semiclassical level.
7 Could the null entropy bound extend to quan-
tum gravity?
While the preceding is very satisfactory, we must note that the null entropy
bound is formulated in terms of the behavior of the entropy of matter,
on a fixed spacetime background. This is already interesting, but for the
possible application to quantum gravity we should ask more. This is because
general relativity is a dynamical theory, with its own degrees of freedom. We
25
would then like to know if there is an extension of the bound, even at the
classical level, which applies not just to a single spacetime, but to a family
of spacetimes which differ by the amplitudes of gravitational waves which
may be present in the region containing a screen or a light sheet. If this
were the case then a corresponding result would be more likely to hold in
quantum gravity, in which there is no fixed spacetime.
Another reason to demand this is that supersymmetry, which seems to
be required for the perturbative consistency of quantum gravity, tells us that
the distinction between the matter and gravitational degrees of freedom is
gauge dependent, and hence not physically meaningful. Furthermore, in
perturbative string theory, which seems necessary for perturbative quantum
gravity, both the matter and gravitational degrees of freedom arise from
excitations of more fundamental degrees of freedom. A bound which requires
a strict separation of matter and gravitational degrees of freedom cannot
then be formulated in a manner consistent with local supersymmetry and is
hence unlikely to extend to supergravity or string theory.
We then investigate, in this section the question of whether there might
hold an extension of the null entropy bound that would hold in either of the
following cases: i) as a statement on the phase space of general relativity,
which allows the fluctuations in the gravitational degrees of freedom to be
turned on, ii) in a quantum theory of gravity or iii) in a locally supersym-
metric theory. While we do not decide the question, we find that there are
two worrying issues, which we now describe.
First problem: Including the gravitational degree of freedom
When the gravitational degrees of freedom are turned on we face a paradox
because the light sheets, L on which the entropy is measured, depend for
their definition on the actual values of the gravitational degrees of freedom.
This dependence is not weak or gradual, as the positions of the singularities
of σ, and hence the location of the boundaries that define L depend non-
linearly on the values of the gravitational degrees of freedom. Thus, even in
classical general relativity, it is difficult to know what would be meant by
the null entropy bound once the gravitational degrees of freedom are turned
on.
The point may be put the following way. Consider a fixed spacetime
(M, gab), which has a Cauchy surface, Σ, which has embedded in it a screen
S which has a future light sheet L. L is then to the future of Σ. Now,
consider a one parameter family of metrics gsab, such that g
0
ab = gab which,
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for s 6= 0 differ from gab in a region F which is to the causal future of a
region R of Σ, not containing S. For each s one can identify the light surface
formed by the future null congruence L(s) from S such that L(0) contains
L. In fact, for each s there will be a light sheet L(s) ⊂ L(s). Using this one
can identify for each s a region U(s) = L(s) ∩ F . Let us pick R such that
at s = 0, U(0) ⊂ L.
Now, the notion of a light sheet would be preserved under variations in
the gravitational degrees of freedom were it the case that for all s, and all
such one parameter families, U(s) ⊂ L(s). However it is easy to see that this
is not the case[57]. The reason is that one can always find one parameter
families gsab, specified by initial data in R such that, for a finite s, all of U(s)
will not be in the future lightsheet L(s). The reason is that the gravitational
radiation will induce caustics to form in U(s) causing θ to be positive on
some part of U(s).
This means that there is no definition of a light sheet which is indepen-
dent of the initial data in a region R of a Cauchy surface containing a screen
S, even if R does not contain S. The null entropy bound may hold for each
light surface L(s) in each spacetime gsab but there is no extension of the
result which holds on the space of solutions or initial data of a spacetime,
even when the degrees of freedom are restricted to vary in regions that do
not include the screen.
What this means is that one cannot extend Bousso’s bound to include
the gravitational degrees of freedom in any way which involves defining
the entropy of the gravitational degrees of freedom in terms of statistical
ensemble of states or histories.
But if this is the case then it is hard to see how there could be an
extension of the null entropy bound either to quantum gravity, in which
case there is no fixed classical spacetime, or in supergravity, in which there
cannot be an invariant distinction between gravitational and matter degrees
of freedom.
Second problem: measurability
Another aspect of the problem just discussed is that once the gravitational
degrees of freedom are turned on, either classically or quantum mechanically,
whether a particular null surface L is a lightsheet of some screen or not
depends on the values of the degrees of freedom. This means that there are
three choices: I) find a formulation of a cosmological entropy bound that
does not require the identification of a lightsheet on which θ ≤ 0, II) try to
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formulate the condition as an operator equation or III) try to formulate it
in terms of expectation values.
The first possibility leads us to the weak entropy bounds, in which the
lightsheet plays no role. In case II one must find a set of commuting op-
erators in quantum gravity which are sufficient to define the notion of a
light sheet and apply it to their eigenvalues. We must then ask whether
the uncertainty principles which arise from the commutation relations of a
quantum theory of gravity allow the simultaneous measurement of quanti-
ties that must be known to apply the bound. To investigate this we shall
assume the standard equal time commutation relations[27, 28, 29]
[Aia(x, t), E˜
b
j (y, t)] = δ
3(x, y)δbaδ
i
j (33)
where Aia is the self-dual connection and E˜
b
j is the dual of the pull back of the
self-dual two form, Σ in any spacelike surface (and all other commutators
vanish). We may note that these hold in a large class of theories, including
all the extended supergravities, as they arise from the generic form[28]
I =
∫
M
ΣAB ∧ A˙AB + . . . (34)
It is difficult to imagine that these do not hold in the effective field theory
which is the low energy limit of string theory or whatever the true quantum
theory of gravity is.
It is not hard to show that,
• If θ±(s) is the expansion of the future and past going null geodesics
normal to a two surface S at a point s ∈ S and A[S] is the area of S
then[30] [
θ±(s), A[S]] = 0 (35)
• Let (s, u) be coordinates on a null surfaces, L, generated by the null
geodesics leaving S orthogonally, where s labels a congruence of null
geodesics and u is an affine parameter along each geodesic such that
S is defined by u = 0. If θ±(s, u) is the expansion of the congruence
at (s, u) then, for u 6= 0 we have,
[
θ±(s, u), A[S]] 6= 0 (36)
[
θ±(s, u), θ±(s)
] 6= 0 (37)
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Thus, there does exist a basis which comes from simultaneously diago-
nalizing the expansion of the congruence of null rays at a screen, and its
area. But in such a basis the operators θ(s, u) off the screen are not diag-
onal. Thus, we cannot identify the outer boundary of the lightsheet in any
basis in which we can identify a screen and measure its area. This suggests
that there cannot exist an operator form of the null entropy bound.
The remaining possibility is to formulate the condition for a screen in
terms of expectation values. Presumably this should be possible in the
semiclassical limit, otherwise the null entropy bound could not be true in
that limit. I am not aware of any proposal to implement it beyond the limit.
One way to see why this is unlikely to work is to discuss how it would have
to work in a path integral formulation of the theory.
Let us first note that to be relevant to the null entropy bound, a histories
formulation will have to be formulated in terms of causal histories, as there
are no analogues of light sheets in Euclidean metrics. Fortunately, there
are now non-trivial proposals[31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37] and results[38, 39]
concerning formulations of quantum gravity in terms of causal,lorentzian
path integrals. In such a causal histories formulation, each history in the
sum over histories comes with its own causal structure. The problems we
are discussing can then be stated as follows: it may be possible to pick out
consistently a set of histories in which the area of a preferred family of sur-
faces and the expansions of null geodesics at those surfaces are given and
fixed. But in these histories the properties of the light surfaces generated
by following null geodesics from the screens cannot be controlled, and will
fluctuate as the sum over histories is taken. Since caustics and other singu-
larities are generic for such surfaces, the observer at the screen will be unable
to control or measure any variables at the screen to prevent the formation
of singularities in the light surfaces of the histories.
Another way to say this is that the degrees of freedom of the light sur-
face include components of the metric and connection on the light surface
itself. Singularities and caustics will form for generic values of these param-
eters, but where they form varies as the degrees of freedom fluctuate. One
cannot then consistently count the number of degrees of freedom on the non-
singular part of the light surface, this involves a logical contradiction since
the presence and location of the singularities itself depends on the values of
the fluctuating degrees of freedom.
Before closing this discussion, we note that our argument does not ex-
clude one radical possibility, which is that there is an entropy associated
with single classical configurations of the gravitational field. This has been
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suggested by Penrose[40], and there are some old arguments for it, which rely
on the impossibility of either building a container to constrain gravitational
radiation, inducing a gravitational ultraviolet catastrophe or measuring the
pure state of gravitational radiation[41]. In the present context this would
suggests that
∫
L σ
abσab, where σ is the shear of the null congruence, might
be taken as a measure of the gravitational entropy on a lightsheet L in a
single classical spacetime.
This is an intriguing possibility, which deserves investigation. It does
not affect the following considerations, as the difficulties we find with a null
form of the holographic principle would not be lessened.
Part II
HOLOGRAPHIC PRINCIPLES
A holographic principle is meant to be a formulation of the dynamics of
a quantum theory in terms of its screen, or boundary hilbert spaces. A
holographic principle requires some form of an entropy bound, but it requires
also that the dynamics of the theory can be formulated entirely in terms of
the degrees of freedom measurable on the screen.
There are different kinds of holographic principles, corresponding to the
different possible kinds of entropy bounds. We consider in turn, strong, null
and weak forms of the holographic principle.
8 The strong holographic principle
The classic formulation of the strong holographic principle is meant to apply
to the case we discussed in section 2. We have a quantum or classical space-
time, M, with a boundary ∂M = R × S, where R corresponds to the time
coordinate. One then postulates boundary and bulk algebras of observables,
AS and Abulk and HS and Hbulk as in section 2. In addition one specifies on
each hilbert space a hermitian hamiltonian hS and hbulk. In a gravitational
theory this may require the specification of gauge conditions on the bound-
ary, in this case there is a family of bulk and boundary hamiltonians which
depend on the gauge conditions. The principle is then formulated as follows
• Strong holographic principle There is an isomorphism
I : Hbulk ↔HS (38)
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such that I ◦ hbulk = hS .
Can this principle be satisfied? There are two cases: gravitational theo-
ries and non-gravitational theories.
Failure of the strong holographic principle in gravitational
theories
By a gravitational theory we mean here theories in which the gravitational
degrees of freedom are allowed to fluctuate, so that any principle must hold
for all the possible initial data that the theory allows. This will be specified
classically or semiclassically by initial data on Σ or quantum mechanically
by the specification of a state in Hbulk. We do not mean quantum field
theory on a particular fixed spacetime metric gab on M.
There is some evidence that the strong holographic principle may hold
in a quantum theory of gravity. One piece of evidence comes from canonical
quantum general relativity, with a non-zero cosmological constant, and cer-
tain boundary conditions, called the Chern-Simons boundary conditions[13,
14, 15]. In this case the boundary Hilbert space is found to be of the form
HS =
∑
a
HaS (39)
where a is an eigenvalue of the area operator, which is known from [23, 24] to
have a discrete spectrum. Each of the eigenspaces HS is a space of SUq(2)
intertwiners on a punctured S2 where the labels on the punctures, which
are taken from the representations of SUq(2) are related to the area[13, 14].
The level k is related to the cosmological constant by[13], k = 6pi/G2Λ.
The dimension of the space of intertwiners does satisfy eq. ( 6), with a
renormalization of Newton’s constant defined by Gren = cGbare, with c =√
3/ ln(2). Thus, it is clear that the weak Bekenstein bound is satisfied.
There are also some results concerning the bulk Hilbert space. Before
the hamiltonian constraint is imposed, an infinite dimensional space of bulk
states can be identified for each a, which has an orthonormal basis given by
the distinct embeddings (up to diffeomorphisms) of quantum spin networks
in the bulk, whose edges meet the boundary at the punctures. One can
then show that there is, for each set of punctures, a finite dimensional space
of solutions to the Hamiltonian constraint which is isomorphic to the corre-
sponding boundary Hilbert space[13]. These are constructing by moding out
the infinite dimensional kinematical Hilbert spaces by a set of equivalence
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relations which generate the recoupling identities of quantum spin networks.
It is known that for a certain class of states these recoupling identities realize
the action of the Hamiltonian constraint[13].
In this case the strong entropy assumption then comes down to the con-
jecture that these provide a complete set of solutions to the Hamiltonian
constraint in the bulk. There is presently no evidence either way on the cor-
rectness of this conjecture. It is attractive to argue that if it is true we have
quantum general relativity in this particular case expressed in closed form
as a theory which satisfies the strong holographic principle. We may also
note that these results all hold for both the euclidean[13] and lorentzian[14]
cases as well as for supergravity[15].
However, if we accept the conclusion of the previous arguments, then
this conjecture must in fact be false. We have found instead that for the
case of a gravitational theory the strong holographic principle cannot hold
unless the boundary of the spacetime has either infinite or indeterminate
area. The reason is that, as we have shown, the strong entropy assumption,
and the strong forms of the Bekenstein bound and the cosmological entropy
bounds all fail. As a result we cannot assume that the bulk and boundary
Hilbert spaces have the same dimension. However, we have also shown that
the weak Bekenstein and weak cosmological entropy bounds hold, which
means that HS is finite dimensional or, generically, is composed of finite
dimensional subspaces, which are the diagonal sectors of the area A[S].
Since no bound has been found to hold which restricts the dimension of
Hbulk there are two possibilities, either it is infinite dimensional, or it does
not exist. In the latter case there is nothing for an isomorphism to map the
boundary state space to. If it is infinite dimensional it could only be mapped
to the boundary which has either indeterminate or infinite area. Thus we
conclude that a form of the strong holographic principle could only hold in
those cases.
Let us now consider the case of indeterminate area more closely. Let us
consider the Schroedinger picture operators, defined in terms of the time at
the boundary. It is clear that by causality Aˆ[S], the operator that measures
the area of the boundary must commute with hbulk, as the latter is a function
only of degrees of freedom in the bulk of Σ which are causally unrelated to
degrees on S. Another way to say this is that where we must be able to move
the boundary locally, thus changing its area, without affecting the physics
in regions of the bulk causally disconnected from the events of moving the
boundary. Since [Aˆ[S], hbulk] = 0, we must be able to construct projection
operators in the bulk, Pˆa corresponding to every eigenvalue, a in the spec-
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trum of Aˆ[S], and define the restricted Hamiltonian habulk = PˆahbulkPˆa. By
causality it must then be the case that the strong holographic principle work
between the corresponding subspaces HaS and Habulk for each value of a.
But now we can apply the argument for the case of a finite area boundary.
Since there is no bound on the dimension of Habulk, it must have infinite
dimension, thus it cannot be isomorphic to HaS .
This leaves only the case that the boundary has infinite area. But in
this case there cannot be a cosmological version of the principle, as generic
spatial regions in generic cosmological solutions have finite area boundaries.
Thus, at best, the strong holographic principle could only apply to the case
of non-compact spacetimes with boundary.
This may be satisfactory, but it comes with a price, which is that we
will not be able to apply the principle to any case in which the boundary
is moved inside the non-compact spacetime to coincide with a finite area
surface. This means that for any such surface, labeled again by its area, a
the holographic correspondence (38) will map all but a finite dimensional
subspace of Habulk to degrees of freedom that are contained within H∞S , but
are not representable within HaS . This must hold for any finite a. It means
that for no finite a can there be any correspondence between Habulk and HaS ,
as almost all of the information in the former is not representable in the
latter. This is counterintuitive, it means no matter how far we move the
boundary out, the representation space of the boundary observables do not
capture most of the information about the bulk observables, so long as the
area of the boundary is finite.
This would be very disappointing, what it really means is that there is no
way going to an infinite boundary can save the situation, once it is realized
that for any finite area boundary there can be no holographic isomorphism
(38). Thus, we conclude that there cannot be an implementation of the
strong holographic principle in a gravitational theory.
Realization of the strong holographic principle in non-gravitational
theories
It is surprising, and striking, that in spite of its failure for gravitational
theories, there are realizations of the strong holographic principle for non-
gravitational theories. These occur in a special case which is Anti-DeSitter
backgrounds in D+1 dimensions[16, 17, 18]. In these spacetimes the asymp-
totic boundary is timelike and is in fact conformally compactified Minkowski
spacetime (CM) in D dimensions. The existence of such a correspondence
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was conjectured first by Maldacena in a string related argument[16, 17], but
has since been shown to hold quite generally for non-gravitational theories
on AdS backgrounds[18]. There is in fact a rigorous theorem in axiomatic
quantum field theory that shows that gives such an isomorphism for generic
field theories on AdS spacetimes[18].
The reason behind this correspondence is clearly that SO(D, 2) acts
as the symmetry group on AdSD+1 and as the conformal symmetry group
of CMD. As a result one can establish an isomorphism (38) for general
quantum field theories on AdS backgrounds.
We can also see why the argument given just above is superseded in the
AdS case. A key fact is that AdS spacetime has no Cauchy surface. The
reason is that the evolution in the bulk requires the specification of data on
the timelike asymptotic boundary of the spacetime. If the boundary fields
are not specified there is no deterministic evolution for the bulk degrees of
freedom. As a result the boundary degrees of freedom are part of a complete
specification of the dynamics of the bulk theory. This makes it less surprising
that the dynamics can be reduced to a description of boundary degrees of
freedom, in this case the bulk to boundary map is plausibly a reduction to the
data necessary to determine a solution, and may play a role similar to that of
the map that relates a solution to boundary data in spacetimes with Cauchy
surfaces. This is very different from what happens in asymptotically flat
spacetimes in which only the only quantities measurable at spatial infinity
are a finite set of conserved quantities.
The key question is then whether there are conformal quantum field
theories for general D on CMD. There are certainly free field theories, for
which the correspondence holds[18]. It may then be expected to hold also
for interacting theories in those special cases in which there is a conformal
quantum field theory on CMD. There is evidence that one such case is
N = 4 supersymmetric Yang-Mills theory for D = 4[16, 17]. By the general
arguments of [18] one would expect there to exist on AdS a supersymmetric
theory, whose spectrum transformed under a supersymmetric extension of
SO(4, 2), with 16 supercharges. There is a great deal of evidence that this
is the case, at least in the limit N →∞. In this case the theory appears to
be the weak coupling limit of supergravity compactified on an AdS5 × S5
background.
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The big question
We then have the following question. We have argued that the strong holo-
graphic principle cannot hold in a gravitational theory. It can hold in a
quantum field theory on a fixed background, and indeed in the particular
case of AdS spacetimes it seems to be a generic feature. But it should be
expected to break down as soon as the gravitational degrees of freedom are
turned on9. More precisely, we expect our first two counterexamples to arise
as soon as either gravitational collapse or inflation could occur in regions of
the bulk.
At the same time, in the particular case of AdS5 × S5 the isomorphism
seems to exist and the bulk theory is then the weak field limit of a gravita-
tional theory. What then happens when the gravitational constant is turned
up, so that the gravitational degrees of freedom are excited? This is the big
question. There seem to be three possibilities:
• 1 Something is wrong with the above reasoning, at least in the case of
supersymmetric theories.
• 2 In supergravity or string theory on spacetimes which are asymptot-
ically AdS5 × S5 the counterexamples cannot arise. This means that
there cannot be small black holes that form from gravitational collapse
and there cannot be any possibility of choosing the initial conditions
in the interior so as to drive the theory into an inflating phase.
• 3 The correspondence holds at the level of the background depen-
dent quantum field theory defined on AdS5×S5 by the weak coupling
limit of supergravity or string theory, but breaks down as soon as the
gravitational constant or the initial data is large enough that strong
gravitational fields can arise.
The first possibility is of course always there, this is why we have been
very careful to keep track of the logic leading to the conclusion that the
strong entropy assumption, strong Bekenstein bound and strong cosmologi-
cal entropy bounds must all be false in gravitational theories. If there is an
9The same questions can also be asked in the 2 + 1 dimensional case, where the
AdS/CFT correspondence has also been worked out[17]. However, given that quantum
gravity and supergravity in 2+ 1 dimensions are topological quantum field theories, there
may be little to learn from this case that is generally useful. TQFT’s are by definition
theories whose observables and states are defined on boundaries of the spacetime.
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error it must be either in the reasoning or in the unexpected failure of one
of the other assumptions listed in section 5.
The second possibility seems unlikely, and in any case were it true it
would mean that this particular case is non-generic in ways that suggest it
is not a very good example of a quantum theory of gravity.
We must then ask if there are any results that contradict the third possi-
bility. At of this writing all of the results found which support the conjecture
in the AdS5 × S5 case relate boundary observables of supergravity on that
background to expectation values of the supersymmetric Yang-Mills theory.
While the construction of representatives in the Yang-Mills theory of bulk
observables in the bulk theory have been discussed, there is so far no cal-
culation which gives a non-trivial test of these correspondences. It is also
the case that most, if not all, of the calculations of N -point functions which
support the conjecture are in any case forced by the action of the super-
symmetry group. It then seems to be the case that even if it disagrees with
some interpretation of the conjectured correspondence, there are no actual
results which so far contradict possibility 3.
There is a final remark which is consistent with this third possibility
which is the following. Gravitationally bound systems including black holes
have generically negative specific heat. However, the positivity of the specific
heat for an equilibrium ensemble is guaranteed for any system defined by a
partition function. In particular, the thermal quantum field theory gotten
by raising the temperature in the N = 4 supersymmetric Yang-Mills theory
is defined by a partition function. Therefor all equilibrium configurations
will have positive specific heat.
We can then ask how configurations such as a system of planets or small
black holes in the bulk of the AdS spacetime are to be represented in terms
of states of the N = 4 supersymmetric Yang-Mills theory. There are two
possibilities: this can be done, but involves configurations that are suffi-
ciently far from equilibrium in the Yang-Mills theory that they cannot be
described by a partition function. Or, the correspondence breaks down as
soon as gravitationally bound states of the bulk theory arise whose statistical
ensembles have negative specific heat.
As a final remark, we note that S duality is still a conjecture, outside
of the BPS sector of either N = 4 superYang-mills theory or string theory.
Thus, if the isomorphism (38) fails beyond the BPS sector there is nothing
that constrains S-duality to hold on both sides of it.
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What about the black hole information paradox?
One reason that the strong holographic principle has been advocated by
some people is that it guarantees a solution to the black hole information
paradox. Thus, one can wonder if there is an independent argument for
the strong holographic principle which follows from the possibility that it
is necessary to give a consistent resolution of the black hole information
paradox.
The answer is negative, because a large part of the black hole information
paradox depends on the strong entropy assumption, which we have found
is false. Once it is realized that the strong entropy assumption is false,
there is no reason to presume that the amount of information measurable
by observers in the interior of the black hole horizon is constrained by the
black holes’s horizon area. One can then imagine that an arbitrarily large
amount of information may be stored in the region to the future of the
horizon independent of its surface area.
One very plausible scenario, which is supported by several semiclassi-
cal calculations, is that there is a bounce as the collapsing star nears what
would be the classical singularity, leading to the formation of a new expand-
ing region of spacetime which could contain an arbitrarily large amount of
information (measured from the point of view of internal observers.) Given
the possibility of making a transition back to an inflationary phase this
region could resemble our universe.
What will then happen when the horizon evaporates. In such a case
there is no real spacetime singularity, and there is correspondingly no need
for an event horizon. This means that attempts to construct a paradox by
making small perturbations to the usual black hole global structure, which
do not eliminate the singularity, are likely of no relevance to the real physical
problem. There will be an apparent horizon and under evaporation it will
shrink to a size at which quantum fluctuations of the gravitational field will
be significant. At this point one will have a small wormhole, linking our
spacetime to the origin of a large inflating region. Most of the information
that went into the black hole will be trapped in the new region, but there
will be no local violation of any physical principle. This does not mean
that there cannot be global unitary evolution in the whole spacetime, but
only that not all measurements made in the interior of the bulk can be
communicated to null infinity.
Is this kind of scenario plausible? This is one of the key questions as we
investigate what form a holographic principle could take in a gravitational
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theory, in which only the weak and null cosmological entropy bounds survive.
9 The null holographic principle
If we give up on the possibility of a strong holographic principle that could
hold in either a gravitational or cosmological theory, we are forced back
to the next strongest possibility, which is to construct a form of the holo-
graphic principle which would extend the null form of the cosmological en-
tropy bound proposed by Bousso. Since that bound is only known to hold
at the semiclassical level in a fixed cosmological spacetime (M, gab), let us
ask what form such a null holographic principle would have to take in this
case.
The problem is clearly to find a collection of light sheets that cover the
spacetime so that the evolution of matter fields may be described in terms
of them. What is needed can be defined as follows.
• A classical spacetime (M, gab) has a single null holographic structure if
there exists a one parameter (continuous or discrete) family of screens
S(t) with a corresponding one parameter family of light sheets L(t),
(each possibly made by joining two lightsheets of S(t)), such that for
any two times, s and t, the classical or quantum state of the matter
on L(s) is completely determined by that on L(t). In the quantum
mechanical case, this means there is a one parameter family of Hilbert
spaces, H(s), which satisfies the bounds
dimH(t) ≤ eA[S(t)]/4Gh¯ (40)
such that there is for each s and t a unitary operator
U(s, t) ◦ H(t) = H(s) (41)
This is the minimal requirement, if there is going to be a representation
of the quantum dynamics of matter in the spacetime (M, gab) that captures
the basic principles of ordinary quantum mechanics.
The problem is that such a structure does not exist for generic spacetimes
(M, gab). By (40) and (41) we see that all the screens in the family must have
the same area, otherwise their Hilbert spaces cannot be unitarily equivalent.
The problem is that in generic spacetimes the lightsheets of any single screen
will not cover the complete future or past of any Cauchy surface. The reason
38
is that the lightsheets are compact, and of limited extent. This is in fact the
whole point of Bousso’s bound. Consequently, given any two screens S(s)
and S(t) it will almost never happen that the corresponding light sheets
L(s) and L(t) form a complete pair. By a complete pair[42, 43, 44] is meant
a pair of non-timelike surfaces such that L(s) is within the causal future of
L(t) and is complete in that no event can be added to L(s) which is also
in the causal future of L(t), which is acausal to L(s), and the same is true
reversing s and t and past and future.
It is only between complete pairs that one can expect to find determin-
istic evolution in either a classical or quantum theory on a fixed spacetime.
In a few very special cases involving highly symmetric spacetimes, one
can find such a single null holographic structure[8, 9]. But these are special
cases in which the symmetry allows the lightsheets to be complete futures of
Cauchy surfaces. One can say that in highly symmetric spacetimes such as
Minkowski or DeSitter spacetime complete lightsheets can exist because by
the symmetry there is so little information for an observer in the spacetime
to measure. Once any inhomogeneity is turned on we expect that the light
surfaces will contract to finite regions and any two will be very unlikely to
make a complete pair. But what is required generically is not only that
we have a family of light surfaces any two of which make a complete pair.
In addition the screens of those light surfaces must all have the same area.
There is no reason to believe these conditions can be satisfied in a generic
spacetime.
Can we weaken the condition? We can if we give up the idea that there is
a one parameter family of light surfaces, each of which has a Hilbert spaces,
all of which are unitarily equivalent. This idea conserved the structure of
ordinary quantum mechanics in which there is a single Hilbert space on
which evolution is unitarily implemented. However it is clearly ruled out.
For a generic spacetime it is clear that the lightsheets of no screen will
be complete in the future or past of any Cauchy surface. In this case if we
want a description in terms of screens we must allow the possibility that
a complete description of the system will require generally more than one
screen, representing information available to different local observers in the
spacetime. This means that a complete holographic description of a quan-
tum field theory in a cosmological spacetime system will generically involve
multiple Hilbert spaces, each of which represents information available to
observers at different screens. Time evolution must then be represented in
terms of maps between density matrices in these HIlbert spaces. Unitary
evolution will only be possible for pairs of such Hilbert spaces that describe
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causal domains that form complete pairs.
Is such a multiple Hilbert space description of a quantum theory in
a cosmological spacetime possible? In fact exactly such a structure was
proposed in [42, 43, 44], under the name of quantum causal histories. It
arose from an independent line of thought, coming from attempts to take
seriously the limitations on the algebra of observables coming from the causal
structure of relativistic cosmological theories. As we showed in [10] this
structure does admit a formulation of a weak holographic principle.
10 Is every two surface a screen?
In some approaches to the cosmological holographic principle, screens are
two surfaces satisfying special conditions. Such conditions are also used to
distinguish which side of a two-surface may be a screen, for example for
screens in normal regions in Bousso’s approach, only one side of a surface
will in general be a screen.
It is then important to ask whether any such conditions may be imposed
in the case of quantum cosmology. There seems to be a problem with each
of the possible conditions that have been offered at the semiclassical level.
• As there are no asymptotic regions, and no boundaries to a cosmolog-
ical spacetime, there are no global event horizons. Generic spacetimes
do not generically contain any single null holographic structures, which
means that the information measurable on any screen cannot be used
to completely specify the state of a classical or quantum cosmology,
and a holographic principle cannot be formulated in terms of any single
one parameter family of screens.
• The operator that measures the convergence of null rays at a surface
does commute with the operator that measures its area. This could
be used in a quantum theory of gravity to distinguish the two sides
of a screen. However, this does not have the same implications in the
quantum theory because the local positive energy conditions on the
energy momentum tensor do not hold even at the semiclassical level.
Because of this null rays may diverge after beginning to converge and
trapped surfaces cannot be distinguished by any local conditions. Fur-
thermore, the operator that measures the convergence of a null ray a
finite distance from the surface does not commute with its convergence
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on the surface. This means that in a quantum theory one cannot ap-
ply the tests we use in the classical theory to pick out a lightsheet.
Consequently there seems to be no reason in the quantum theory to
choose one side of a screen over another.
• No condition can be imposed having to do with the volume of a space-
like region bounding a screen, for the volume of a region is measured
by a quantum mechanical operator[24, 25]. Generic states will be su-
perpositions of eigenstates of the volume operator for any region. One
can thus not require that the side of a two-surface which encloses the
smallest volume is a screen.
• As we see from several of the counterexamples, there is no paradox
in considering both sides of a surface to be a screen, so long as one
understands the entropy bound weakly, so that it applies only to infor-
mation gained by making measurements of fields at the surface, which
may or may not allow deductions to be made concerning the density
matrix or state to the causal past of the surface.
If there is no criteria which can be applied in a quantum theory of cos-
mology to pick out which surfaces are screens, or to pick one of the two
sides of a two-surface to serve as a screen, then we must conclude that every
two-surface may be a screen, and the opposite side of any screen may also
be a screen. In the quantum theory one may still make observations on
a screen, but one will not in general be allowed to deduce anything about
the extent to which those observations allow a complete description of the
physics on a finite lightsheet. Since that was the reason to prefer one screen
over another, the conclusion is that in the quantum theory if a screen is a
useful concept, then all two surfaces may be screens.
This conclusion will play an important role in the weak holographic prin-
ciple because it means that in a quantum theory we may use the properties
of a screen as a place where measurements may be made to constrain, or
even define,its geometrical properties, rather than the reverse, which is what
we do in the semiclassical theory.
11 Conclusions reached so far
To motivate the weak form of the holographic principle we summarize the
results of the argument so far.
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• The strong entropy conjecture is apparently false, which means that
the weak, rather than the strong version of the Bekenstein bound is
true.
• The strong cosmological entropy bound is false.
• The null cosmological entropy bound cannot be formulated in a quan-
tum theory of gravity once the gravitational degrees of freedom are
turned on, at least in the conventional terms in which entropy is re-
lated to the lack of purity of density matrices.
• The weak cosmological entropy bound may be satisfied in a quantum
theory of gravity. This is formulated as a relationship between the
information capacity of a screen S, as measured by the dimension of the
Hilbert space HS which provides the smallest faithful representation
of the algebra of observables AS on the screen, and its area A[S].
• From the wiggly surface problem we learn that the appropriate mea-
sure of the area of a screen is not the area of S. Instead, the amount
of information that can be stored on any screen, S is bounded by the
minimal area of the cross sections of congruences of light rays that
intersect S. This means that a causal structure is required in order to
make sense of a holographic bound in a quantum cosmological theory.
• The information coded on a screen S then concerns its causal past.
But it then follows that in most histories there will be no single screen
on which a complete description of the universe may be coded, for
there will, in the classical limit, be generally no spacelike two-surface
such that the past of its lightsheets contains a Cauchy surface. (We
see this also from the throat and inflationary examples.) From this it
follows that a holographic description in a quantum cosmology must
involve many screens Si, and that the information available at any one
screen will almost always be incomplete.
• One implication of this is that the most complete description of the
quantum state available on any single Si must be a density matrix ρi
on Hi. This is because there will in general be quantum correlations
that connect measurements made on Si with degrees of freedom that
are recorded on other surfaces Sj.
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12 The weak holographic principle
A weak form of the holographic principle must be consistent with these
conclusions. One possible form, which is, is that given in [10]. In somewhat
less technical language than that give there, the principle holds that
1. A holographic cosmological theory must based on a causal history,
that is, the events in the quantum spacetime form a partially ordered
set under their causal relations.
2. Among the elements of the quantum spacetime, a set of screens can
be identified. A screen S, is a 2-sided object, which means that it
consists of a left and right side, each of which has a distinct past and
future, but such that the past right side is to the immediate past of
the future left side, and visa versa.
3. Associated to each side of the screen, labeled L, andR are an algebra of
observables, AL.RS each of which is represented on a finite dimensional
Hilbert space HL,RS . The observables in AL.R describe information
that an observer at the screen may acquire about the causal past of
one side of the screen, by measurements of fields on that side of the
immediate past of the left or right side of the screen.
4. HLS = HR †S , which means they have the same dimension.
5. All observables in the theory are operators in the algebra of observables
A(S) for some screen S.
6. The area of a screen S is defined to be
A[S] ≡ 4Gh¯ lnDim (HS) (42)
More discussion of this principle may be found in [10]. Its message is
that all observables in a quantum theory of cosmology are associated with
two-surfaces, and represent information reaching a surface from its causal
past. Besides the logic we have followed here, there are two sets of arguments
that might be used to support this hypothesis.
Quasi-local quantities in classical general relativity
Even in classical general relativity, it is well understood that diffeomorphism
invariance and the equivalence principle forbid the possibility of local def-
initions of the basic dynamical quantities such as energy, momentum and
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angular momentum. These kinds of quantities can only be defined in terms
of integrals over two dimensional surfaces in the spacetime. When those
surfaces are taken to the boundary, in non-cosmological spacetimes, these
become the well known asymptotic definitions of energy, momentum and an-
gular momentum. However, even in cosmological spacetimes where there are
no boundaries one may define what are called quasi-local observables[45, 46],
in which the energy, momentum and angular momentum of an arbitrary
region are defined in terms of certain integrals over its boundary. Since
Penrose’s original suggestion[45] many different proposals have been made
for such quasi-local observables[46].
If there are to be non-trivial notions of energy, momentum and angular
momentum in a quantum theory of cosmology then, these must be defined
so that their classical limits are these quasi-local quantities. The simplest
possibility is that the hamiltonian in quantum gravity should itself be quasi-
local, that is defined on two dimensional surfaces, which in the classical limit
will become spacelike surface embedded in spacetime. This implies some
form of the holographic principle, for if the Hamiltonian is associated with
surfaces there must be many hamiltonians, each associated with a different
choice of surfaces, and the same must be true of the algebra of observables
and the hilbert spaces on which they are represented.
Relational approaches to quantum cosmology
Another kind of argument for the importance of surface observables in a
quantum theory of cosmology was given by Crane[3], even before the holo-
graphic hypothesis of ‘t Hooft and Susskind was proposed. Crane noted the
difficulties of defining a coherent measurement theory for a quantum state
“of the whole universe” and proposed instead that the division of the uni-
verse into two parts-system and observer-that is basic to Bohr and Heisen-
berg’s measurement theory might be relativised, so that there would be not
one quantum state of the universe, but a system of observable algebras and
hilbert spaces, one associated with every possible splitting of the universe
into two parts[3].
To realize this idea, Crane proposed a categorical framework to describe
the association of Hilbert spaces with boundaries. This was based on posit-
ing functorial relationships between the category of cobordisms of manifolds
and the category of Hilbert spaces[3]. These structures are closely related
to topological quantum field theory, as those theories can be formulated in
such categorical terms. As topological quantum field theories are the only
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class of field theories that naturally yield finite dimensional Hilbert spaces,
one may try to use them to construct examples of holographic theories[13].
Furthermore, as Crane pointed out, it may be possible to extend these struc-
tures to quantum theories of gravity because it is a fact that at both the
classical and quantum mechanical level, and for any dimension[47], general
relativity and supergravity can be understood as deformed or constrained
topological quantum field theories[49, 23, 13, 19, 51, 50, 14, 15].
Crane’s proposal has been an inspiration for the development of what
have been called relational[48, 42, 43, 44] or pluralistic [19, 5] approaches to
quantum cosmology. Using the fact that general relativity and supergravity
are constrained topological field theories, it has been possible to realize this
idea in the context of full formulations of quantum gravity and M theory
[33, 34, 54].
An even stronger version of Crane’s argument was proposed recently by
Markopoulou[42, 43, 44], who noted that even in classical general relativ-
ity the logic of propositions which can be given truth values by observers
in a closed universe is non-boolean, because each observer can only assert
the truth of falsity of propositions about their past. Rather than being
a boolean algebra, the algebra of propositions relevant for a classical cos-
mological theory is a multivalued Heyting algebra[42]. When quantized, the
resulting algebra of projection-like operators cannot be represented on a sin-
gle Hilbert space, instead, it requires a collection of Hilbert spaces, one for
every possible event at which observations are made[43]. As each observer
receives information from a distinct past, the algebra of observables they
can measure, and hence the Hilbert spaces on which they represent what
they observe, must vary10. Given the conclusions reached in the preceding
sections of this paper, this is framework is then appropriate for a formulation
of the weak holographic principle[10].
13 Conclusions
The conclusion of the arguments we have given here is that the holographic
bound and holographic principle can only survive in a quantum theory of
cosmology in their weak forms, proposed in [10]. While logically weaker,
this form is more radical than the strong forms, in its implications for how
10Related structures have been studied also by Isham and collaborators [55], who note
that structures built of many Hilbert spaces can be used to formulate the consistent
histories proposal[56] precisely.
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a measurement theory of quantum cosmology must be constructed. First,
the weak forms require that causal structure exist even at the Planck scale.
This most likely cannot be realized in a conventional formulation of quantum
cosmology in which the observables of the theory act on a single Hilbert space
containing the physically allowed “wavefunctions of the universe.” Instead,
such a description may have to be formulated along the lines proposed in
[42, 43, 44] in which there is a network of Hilbert spaces, each providing
a representation for an algebra of observables accessible to a single local
observer at an event or a local region of a spacetime history. These will be
related to each other by maps which reflect the quantum causal structure.
In such a spacetime, evolution becomes closely intertwined with the flow
of quantum information which also defines the causal structure at the Planck
scale. Interactions have to do with the processing of the information at
events; as noted in [43, 44] a quantum spacetime then becomes very like a
quantum computer that can dynamically evolve its circuitry.
It is then difficult to escape the conclusion that the holographic princi-
ple, in its weak form, is telling us that nature is fundamentally discrete. The
finiteness of the information available per unit area of a surface is to be taken
simply as an indication that fundamentally, geometry must turn out to re-
duce to counting. Of course this conclusion has been reached independently
through other arguments coming from quantum gravity[1, 23, 24, 25, 5] and
string theory[52, 2]. But, as can be seen most clearly from the argument of
Jacobson[53], the entropy bounds and holographic principle tell us that the
description of nature in terms of classical spacetime geometry is not only
analogous to the laws of thermodynamics, it must be exactly the thermody-
namics of the fundamental discrete theory of spacetime.
What we learn from the analysis of this paper is that in such a theory
there is no room for the notion of a bulk theory, and hence no fundamen-
tal role for a bulk-boundary correspondence. There is instead a network of
screen histories, which describe what possible observers might be able to
observer from particular events in their spacetime. By averaging over histo-
ries a bulk description may emerge at the semiclassical level, but only as an
approximation in which the past of a particular observer can be described to
first order in a perturbation expansion in terms of a particular fixed classical
history. Thus the proper role of a bulk-to-boundary map may be to serve as
a correspondence principle to constrain the classical limit of a background
independent quantum theory of gravity.
To put it most simply: the holographic principle is not about a rela-
tionship between two sets of concepts, bulk and screen and geometry and
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information flow. It is the statement that the former reduce entirely to the
latter in exactly the same sense that thermodynamic quantities reduce to
atomic physics. The familiar picture of bulk spacetimes with fields and ge-
ometry must emerge in the semiclassical limit, but these concepts can play
no role in the fundamental theory.
Can this picture be used to construct a realistic quantum theory of grav-
ity which addresses also the other problems in the subject? As mentioned
in [10] an example of such a theory is provided by a class of background in-
dependent membrane theories proposed in [33]. These extend the formalism
of loop quantum gravity in a way as to provide a possible background inde-
pendent form of string theory[34, 54]. So the answer is a very provisional,
yes. Much work remains to be done, but the moral is that the holographic
principle, in at least its weak form, is likely to feature significantly in both
the mathematical language and the measurement theory of the future back-
ground independent quantum theory of gravity.
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